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Socialized Liability in Chinese Tort Law
Chenglin Liu*

ABSTRACT
This article explores two unique aspects of the Chinese Tort Liability Law (TLL):1 (1)
Article 24 holds that a party not at fault shall share the loss with the victim in non-strict
liability cases under undefined circumstances, and (2) the government often shields a party
at fault from liability in mass tort cases by disregarding the TLL entirely. These two aspects
may seem contradictory; however, they are both based on the same principle of socialized
liability, which is first articulated in this article.
Scholars often claim that Article 24 embodies the principle of equitable liability. This
article challenges such claims and asserts that Article 24 is, in fact, inequitable because it
allows a party not at fault to be held liable. Article 24 defies the traditional notion that
liability should not only be based on fault, but also proportional to fault. Thus, it failed to
provide a clear standard of care that individuals and entities can follow to avoid liability.
This article argues that the principle of socialized liability is helpful in discerning the
essence of Article 24 and other related provisions in the TLL. The new principle explains
why Chinese lawmakers and courts are willing to deviate from fault-based liability, the
bedrock of Western tort law. Through the lens of socialized liability, this article analyzes
leading tort cases that have invoked Article 24 and related provisions, as well as several
* Chenglin Liu is a Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. I am grateful to my
colleagues Vincent Johnson, John Teeter, Bonita Roberts, and Bernie Kray for their valuable
comments. I would like to express my gratitude to Yang Chenggeng, Gao Qi, Wang Yongxia, Guo
Dong and other Chinese law professors for their insights, encouragement and friendship. They
helped me with finding Chinese tort law cases and commentaries, without which this article would
not have been possible. Also, an anonymous commentator provided his or her critical feedback on
the first draft of the article, for which I am grateful. I would also like to thank Katie Neidig, Cali
Franks, and Daniella Alvarado for their excellent assistance.
1
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Ze Ren FA (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort
Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China] [hereinafter “TLL”] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/200912/26/content_1497435.htm.
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incidents where the government has deliberately disregarded the TLL. This analysis reveals
that the socialized liability principle aligns well with the broader goals the Chinese
government intends to achieve, in particular, maintenance of social stability and promotion
of state economic interests. Either imposing liability on a party not at fault, or shielding an
at-fault party from liability serves the same purpose—maintaining social stability, which
is at core of the socialized liability principle.
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 26, 2009, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC)
enacted the Tort Liability Law (TLL), the first comprehensive tort code in the history of
the People’s Republic of China (the PRC). It took effect on July 1, 2010.2 The TLL is
composed of ninety-two articles in twelve chapters.3 Consistent with codes in other areas
of law, the first few chapters of the TLL lay out general principles.4 The remaining chapters
focus on specific liabilities for injuries caused by defective products, automobile accidents,
medical malpractice, environmental pollution, domesticated animals, abnormally
dangerous activities, and invasion of personal property.5
The TLL claims to protect individuals’ civil rights and interests, punish and prevent
tortious conduct, and maintain social harmony and stability.6 It offers a wide range of
protection for individual rights, such as the rights to life, health, name, reputation, honor,
self-image, privacy, marital autonomy, guardianship, ownership, security, copyright,
patent, trademark, discovery, equities, and succession.7 Chinese academia often views tort
law as a private law, which supposedly recognizes the individual autonomy of the parties
more than any other areas of law.8 In fact, however, the TLL is deeply characterized by
2

Id.
Id.
4
Id. From Chapter I to Chapter IV, the TLL covers General Provisions, Constituting Liability and
Methods of Assuming Liability, Circumstances to Waive Liability and Mitigate Liability and
Special Provision on Tortfeasors.
5
See id. at Chapter V to Chapter XI.
6
TLL, supra note 1, at Art. 1.
7
Id. at Art. 2.
8
See generally Yang Gengde (阳庚德), Sifa Chengfa Lun (私法惩罚论) [On the Punitive Nature
of Private Law], 21 (6) PEKING U. L. J. (中外法学) 835, 835 (2009). (arguing that it is not settled
whether tort law, as a private law, should punish tortfeasors) Li Xia (李霞), Gaokong Paowu
Zhiren Sunhai de Falv Jiuji (高空抛物致人损害的法律救济) [The legal remedies for injuries
caused by falling objects], J. SHANDONG U. (SOC. SCI. ED,) (山东大学学报) 113, 116 (2011)
(arguing that Article 87 of the TLL should be based on the principle of private law); Sun Zhengwei
(孙政伟)， Lun Sifa Shang de Chengfa （论私法上的惩罚）[The penalties based on private
law], 140 (5) J. ZHEJIANG GONGSHANG U. (浙江工商大学学报) 53, 54 (2016) (arguing the
German jurisprudence on the dichotomy of private and public law has deeply influenced the study
3
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socialism and is used as a tool to maintain social stability, which is the overwhelming goal
of the state.9 It is impossible for the TLL to remain independent and free from political
influence.10
of Chinese civil law); Zhang Jiayong (张家勇)，Lun Tongyi Taopai Ren Dui Taopai Jidongche
Zhaoshi de Peichang Zeren--Yi Gongsi Fa de Guanxi Wei Shijiao (论同意套牌人对套牌机动车
肇事的赔偿责任—以公私法的关系为视角) [The liabilities for a driver who fraudulently uses a
license plate and causes injuries to others—from a perspective of private and public law] 203 (12)
JINAN J. (PHI. & SOC. SCI. ED.) (暨南学报), 101, 108 (2015) (deeming tort law as a private law);
Wu Yuanyuan (吴元元), Falv Fu’ai Zhuyi yu Qinquanfa zhi Shi (法律父爱主义与侵权法之失)
[Legal paternalism and the failure of tort law], 70 (3) J. EAST CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L. (华东政
法大学学报)133, 133 (2010) (stating that tort law belongs in the category of private law); Bai Jiang
(白江), Woguo Ying Kuoda Chengfa Xing Peichang zai Qinquanfa Zhong de Shiyong Fanwei (我
国应扩大惩罚赔偿在侵权法中的适用范围) [China should expand the scope of their application
of punitive damages in tort cases], 9 (3) TSINGHUA U. L. J. 111, 118 (清华法学) (2015) (arguing
that a tortious act violates private law).
9
Shen Huiwen (申惠文), Woguo 《 Qinquan Zeren Fa 》 Sunhai Buchang Tiaokuan De Jieshi
Lun (我国《侵权责任法》损害补偿条款的解释论) [Comments On The Interpretation Of The
Compensation Provisions In The TLL] 91, J. OF SW. U. OF POL. SCI. & L.(西南政法大学学报)
(2014) (arguing the TLL is the product of the socialist jurisprudence),
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleFullText.aspx?ArticleId=91118; Yuan Wenquan and Yang
Tianhong (袁文全 杨天红)，Jiangou Da Guimo Qinquan Zonghe Yingdui Tixi de Biyao Xing Ji
Jiben Shexiang—Jiyu Qinquan Zeren Fa de Lifa Mudi建构大规模侵权综合应对体系的必要性
及基本设想---基于《侵权责任法》的立法目的 [The necessity of constructing a comprehensive
responsive system for dealing with mass torts---A study of the legislative purpose of the TLL], 12
J. S.W. U. Nationalities (L. Sci. Ed.) (西南民族大学学报)，93，95（2014）(arguing that mass
torts could seriously damage public trust in the government making it necessary to establish a
system to provide adequate compensation for tort victims, who could become a potential force to
cause social unrest if they are left uncompensated); Yuan Wenquan and Yang Tianhong (袁文全
杨天红)， Zhengfu Jiuji Da Guimo Qinquan de Falv Kaoliang政府救济大规模侵权的法律考量
[Some thoughts on the remedies provided by the government in mass torts], 200 (3) J. Soc. Sci. (
社会科学辑刊) 90, 90-92 (2012) (arguing the lack of adequate compensation for tort victims
threatens social stability); Wu Liangjun (吴俍君)， Da Guimo Qinquan Sunhai Duoyuan Jiuji
Jizhi de Jiangou大规模侵权损害多元化救济机制的建构 [A multi-faceted approach to providing
remedies in mass tort cases], 26 (6) J. Sichuan U. Sci. & Eng. (Soc. Sci. Ed.)（四川科技大学学
报, 66, 68-70 (2011) (arguing that providing adequate remedies for victims in mass tort cases is
conducive to maintaining social stability); Wang Liming (王利明), Jianli he Wanshan Duoyuan
Hua de Shouhai Ren Jiuji Jizhi 建立和完善多元化的受害人救济机制 [Establishing and
improving a well maintained and multifaceted system to provide tort victims with legal remedies]，
4 J. Chinese L. (中国法学) 146, 150 (2009) (claiming the lack of remedies for tort victims would
cause social unrest).
10
The above-cited articles invariably argue the necessity for the government to establish funds for
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This article explores two unique aspects of the Chinese Tort Liability Law (TLL): (1)
Article 24 holds that a party not at fault shall share the loss with the victim in non-strict
liability cases under undefined circumstances, and (2) the government often shields a party
at fault from liability in mass tort cases by disregarding the TLL entirely. These two aspects
may seem contradictory; however, they are both based on the same principle of socialized
liability, which is first articulated in this article.
Scholars often claim that Article 24 embodies the principle of equitable liability. This
article challenges such claims and asserts that Article 24 is, in fact, inequitable because it
allows a party not at fault to be held liable. Article 24 defies the traditional notion that
liability should not only be based on fault, but also proportional to fault. Thus, it failed to
provide a clear standard of care that individuals and entities can follow to avoid liability.
This article argues that the principle of socialized liability is helpful in discerning the
essence of Article 24 and other related provisions in the TLL. The new principle explains
why Chinese lawmakers and courts are willing to deviate from fault-based liability, the
bedrock of Western tort law. Through the lens of socialized liability, this article analyzes
leading tort cases that have invoked Article 24 and related provisions, as well as several
incidents where the government has deliberately disregarded the TLL. This analysis reveals
that the socialized liability principle aligns well with the broader goals the Chinese
government intends to achieve, in particular, maintenance of social stability and promotion
of state economic interests. Either imposing liability on a party not at fault, or shielding an
at-fault party from liability serves the same purpose—maintaining social stability, which
is at core of the socialized liability principle.
II. FROM EQUITABLE LIABILITY TO SOCIALIZED LIABILITY
A. EQUITABLE LIABILITY (公平原则)
Scholars claim that the principle of equitable liability originated from some earlier versions
of provisions of German and Soviet civil law.11 In 1900, a draft amendment of the German
Civil Code provided that the court could require an actor who was not at fault to

tort victims to maintain social stability. While the government plays a crucial role in providing tort
compensation, it frequently directs courts to dismiss torts case brought by individual tort victims,
especially, in mass tort cases. See also Section VII of the article.
11
See Cao Xianfeng (曹险峰)， Lun Gongping Zeren De Shiyong —— Yidui 《 Qinquan Zeren
Fa 》 Di 24 Tiao De Jieshi Lun Yandu Wei Zhongxin， (论公平责任的适用——以对《侵权责
任法》第24条的解释论研读为中心) [The Application of Article 24 of the TLL and the Equitable
Liability Principle], J. N.W. U. POL. SCI. & L. (LEGAL SCI.), (西北政法大学学报) 104, 105,
(2012).
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compensate the victim based on circumstances.12 Scholars immediately reacted with
disapproval, claiming that the proposed provision was so vague that it was intolerable.13
As a result, the provision was not included in the revised German law.14
According to Article 406 of the Soviet Union Civil Code of 1922, if an actor was not liable
for the victim’s harm, the court could still order the actor to compensate the victim based
on wealth situations of the two parties.15 This provision was hardly applied in the practice,
even to Soviet jurists, who criticized Article 406 for creating legal uncertainty.16 With the
development of the socialist welfare system, which substantially diminished the wealth gap
among the people, the equitable liability provision became obsolete in Soviet law in 1964.17
In 1986, China enacted the first outline of the civil law entitled The General Principles of
Civil Law (the GPCL), which borrowed heavily from both German and Soviet law.18
Article 132 of the GPCL provides, “if none of the parties are at fault in causing damage,
they may share civil liability according to the actual circumstances.”19 This provision
served as the basis of Article 24 of the TLL.20
B. SOCIALIZED LIABILITY (责任社会化)
By invoking equitable liability, Chinese courts grant relief to victims even though the
defendant is not at fault in non-strict liability cases. This arcane aspect of the Chinese tort
law puzzles foreign scholars who are accustomed to tort cases where fault is almost a
12

Chen Benhan (陈本寒), Chen Ying (陈英), Gongping Zeren Guize Yuanze De Zai Tantao—
Jianping Woguo 《 Qinquan Zeren Fa 》 Di 24 Tiao Lijie Yu Shiyong, (公平责任归责原则的再
探讨—兼评我国《侵权责任法》第 24 条的理解与适用) [Comments on Understanding and
Applying Article 24 of the TLL], 172 L. REV. (法学评论), 136, 140 (2012).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See Cao, supra note 11.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Percy R. Luney Jr., Traditions and Foreign Influences: Systems of Law in China and Japan, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 140 (1989) (“The German-style Soviet Code's influence is readily
apparent in the General Principles’ ‘socialist’ provisions.”).
19
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [The General
Principles of Civil Law (GPCL)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong. April 12, 1986,
effective Jan. 1, 1987) (Lawinfochina).
20
Chen Ke (陈科), Gongping Zeren Yiban Tiaokuan de Sifa Shiyong—Yi 100 fen Qinquan An’li
Panjueshu Wei Fenxi Yangben (公平责任一般条款的司法适用—以100份侵权案件判决书为分
析样本) [The study of the equity principle in the judicial practices by examining 100 torts cases],
1 J. Application of L. (法律适用) 11, 11 (2015). (stating that Article 24 of the TLL is derived from
Article 132 of the GPCL)
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prerequisite for remedy.21 Instead of using the term “equitable liability,” this article refers
it as “socialized liability.” The latter term is more accurate and helpful in discerning the
essence of Article 24 and other related articles in the TLL.
The principle of socialized liability holds that tort liability should be imposed or limited as
necessary to ensure social stability or confidence in the Communist Party of China (the
Party). In practice, the principle allows Chinese courts to hold a party who is not at fault
liable for a victim’s injuries. In addition, it also allows courts to deny claims against a party
who is at fault in mass tort cases.
As a unique legal concept of recent origin, socialized liability has no well-defined
boundaries, and it lacks certainty and predictability. Consequently, individuals and
property owners do not know how to avoid liability. Despite its ambiguity, socialized
liability remains an essential legal basis for Chinese courts to allocate losses among parties.
Specifically, socialized liability serves two main social goals, which may at times overlap
or conflict with each other:
First, socialized liability protects the state’s economic interests. Since the economic
reforms in the early 1980s, China has transitioned from a Soviet-style planned economy to
a so-called market economy with Chinese characteristics.22 The transition, however, is
incomplete as China is still a command economy, in which the state controls most of the
vital industrial sectors, such as transportation, telecommunication, energy, banking, and
health care.23 These state-owned enterprises or entities (SOEs) enjoy preferential treatment
in laws compared to consumers and private competitors. The SOEs not only play a major
role in shaping the law, but they can also impose pressure on courts in cases of industrial
accidents. The government often instructs courts to interpret the law favorably to SOEs, or
to simply deny claims against SOEs or other enterprises with strong government backing.24
Second, socialized liability serves the Party’s goal of maintaining stability and control.25
Since the founding of the PRC, the Party has firmly held onto its power through a
21

Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, & Ellen M. Bublick, HORNBOOK ON TORTS 4 (2nd ed. 2016).
(“In the great majority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the conclusion that the wrongdoer
was at fault in a legally cognizable way.”).
22
See generally, Justin Yifu Li, Lessons of China’s Transition from a Planned Economy to a Market
Economy, THE DISTINGUISHED WSPIZ AND TIGER LECTURE AT KOZMINSKI SCHOOL OF
MANAGEMENT, WARSAW, POLAND, Dec. 17, 2004,
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1996/11/cj16n2-3.pdf.
23
Scott Cendrowski, China’s Global 500 Companies Are Bigger Than Ever—And Mostly StateOwned, FORTUNE (Jul. 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/china-global-500-governmentowned.
24
See Section VII of this Article.
25
See Susan Trevaskes et al. ed., THE POLITICS OF LAW AND STABILITY IN CHINA, 1 (2014).
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combination of military might, political coercion, ideological pressure, and constraining
political enemies.26 The Party initially predicated its legitimacy on its leadership and
sacrifice in gaining China’s independence from Western imperialists. After Mao’s
generation in the late 1970s, however, the revolutionary narrative was less persuasive,
particularly among the young, many of whom were better educated and extensively
exposed to Western ideas.27 Consequently, the Party developed a new narrative arguing
that it deserves to govern the country because it will continue to ensure economic
prosperity and social stability.28
Although the new narrative appeals to wide audiences, China’s pursuit of economic
prosperity has produced very uneven results.29 The rapidly increasing gap between the rich
and poor has contributed to social instability. Social unrest poses a serious challenge to the
Party, which seems unable to eliminate the prosperity gap.30 In the absence of democratic
discourse, the Party faces enormous difficulties in detecting elements of dissatisfaction.31
Therefore, the Party has become oversensitive about public protests. As Professor Wei
Zhang observed, “Unlike the democracies where the median voter’s opinion tends to
prevail, the authoritarian government in China cares more about ‘the vocal extremists who
are most likely to take to the street.’”32 Therefore, a top priority for the Party is to respond
to high-profile controversies or natural disasters. In doing so, the Party attempts to
demonstrate its genuine concern for its citizens and to solidify its public support in order
to enhance its legitimacy.33

26

Xin Ren, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION, 47–64 (1997).
See Roger V. Des Forges, Ning Luo, Yen-bo Wu, Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989:
Chinese and American Reflections, 109 (1993). By China’s official estimates, the number of
Chinese students who study abroad each year is between 700,000 and 800,000. See also Luo
Wangshu, More Chinese Set to Study Overseas, China Daily, Mar. 8, 2017,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017twosession/2017-03/08/content_28470916.htm.
28
See Jinghan Zeng, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S CAPACITY TO RULE: IDEOLOGY,
LEGITIMACY AND COHESION, § 1.2 (2015).
29
See Ian Talley, China Is One of the Most Unequal Countries in the World, IMF Paper Says,
WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/03/26/china-is-one-of-mostunequal-countries-in-the-world-imf-paper-says/.
30
See Ansuya Harijani, China Wealth Gap May Be Far Worse Than Official Estimates, CNBC
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/29/china-wealth-gap-may-be-far-worse-thanofficial-estimates.html
31
See Wei Zhang, Understanding the Law of Torts in China: A Political Economy Perspective, 11
U. PENN. ASIAN L. REV. 171, 194 (2016).
32
Id.
33
KJELD ERIK BRØDSGAARD (ed.), CHINESE POLITICS AS FRAGMENTED AUTHORITARIANISM:
EARTHQUAKES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, 89 (2016).
27
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The TLL is one of the tools the Party uses to solve thorny social issues and prevent
disgruntled victims from taking their grievances to social media or even the streets. Viewed
against this background, a fault-based tort principle appears burdensome and difficult to
manipulate to the Party’s liking. In addition, inquiries into fault can expose the problems
of mismanagement and corruption, attracting unnecessary attention and further arousing
public resentment.34
Socialized liability, however, is flexible and adaptive. A court can quickly compensate
victims without assigning fault. In some cases, the government and the Party have relied
on the principle of socialized liability to force victims to accept low compensation and
promise not to pursue further legal actions. Ironically, an inquiry into fault in mass tort
cases, as the Party sees it, could lead to instability. Thus, socialized liability will remain as
an indispensable principle in the TLL precisely because it is so ambiguous and can be
easily manipulated to reach whatever legal result the Party favors.
III. CASES BASED ON ARTICLE 24 OF THE TLL
Article 24 of the TLL provides, “if neither the victim nor the actor is at fault for the harm
to the victim, the two parties may share the victim’s loss according to the circumstances.”35
From the wording of the Article, it is unclear when and how courts should invoke it. The
words, such as “may,” “share,” and “circumstances” can cause confusion among judges,
lawyers, and academics. Since there is no official interpretation from the Supreme People’s
Court, lower courts often take a broad approach in applying Article 24, rather than
methodically breaking down the elements in a traditional way of applying a statute.36 In
34

Gu Weixia, Responsive Justice in China During Transitional Times: Revisiting the Juggling Path
Between Adjudicatory and Mediatory Justice, 14 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 49, 54 (2015)
(stating that the government required judges to resolve cases that would cause social unrest through
mediation). See also Lawyers Warned to Shun Milk Suits, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept.
23, 2008, http://www.scmp.com/article/653669/lawyers-warned-shun-milk-suits (stating that the
government prohibited lawyers from representing victims in mass torts cases); Jun Xie and Lijuan
Sun, Access to Collective Litigation in China: A Tough Work, 3 J. POL. & L. 45, 48 (2010),
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/5277.
35
TLL, supra note 1, at Art. 24.
36
While writing this article, the author reviewed hundreds of cases that applied Article 24 of the
TLL from the Supreme People’s Court database, which is available at wenshu.court.gov.cn. From
these cases, it is extremely difficult to find any reasoning from the courts, especially the lower
courts, as to why and when Article 24 is applicable. The following are typical examples where
courts found that defendants were not at fault, but ordered them to share plaintiffs’ losses.
(1) In China, it is a custom for the groom to carry the bride to their decorated bedroom, a ritual
that symbolizes a harmonious and happy life. In such a process, Luo Wenjun slipped and
fell on a wet floor while he was carrying his bride Qiu Yingxia. As a result, Qiu flew out
of Luo’s arms and hit a pole, receiving severe injuries. Qiu sued Luo for medical expenses
and living costs. Although the court found Luo free from fault, it ordered him to pay Qiu
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RMB 1,045 ($150) based on Article 24 of the TLL. The court did not explain why Article
24 was applicable in this case. Qiu Yingxia Yu Luo Wenjun Jiankang Quan Jiufen Yishen
Minshi Panjue Shu岳映霞与罗文军健康权纠纷一审民事判决书 (The Court Order in
the Civil Case of Qiu Yingxia v. Luo Wenjun), (甘肃省秦安县人民法院) (Gansu Province
Qin’an County People’s Ct., Mar. 24, 2014) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>;
(2) In this case, a student slipped and fell on his way from the school’s cafeteria to the
dormitory, causing him to lose four front teeth. The student filed a lawsuit against the
school for negligence. Even though the court found that the school was not negligent, it
ordered that the school pay the plaintiff RMB 14,148 ($ 2,200) for the implantation of his
teeth. The court cited Article 24 of the TLL without explaining why and how it applied in
this case. Li Yang Yu Pingdu Shi Dijiu Zhongxue Yishen Minshi Panjue Shu李扬与平度市
第九中学一审民事判决书 (The Court Order in the Civil Case of Li Yang v. Pingdu No. 9
Middle School), (山东省平度市⼈⺠法院) (Shandong Province Pingdu County People’s
Ct., June 20, 2013) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>;
(3) In this case, a student broke his right hand in a physical education class while he attempted
to pass a pommel horse under the teacher’s supervision. The court agreed with the school
that the pommel horse routine for basic gymnastic education was a state-required course
that all students must learn and pass. However, based on Article 24 of the TLL, the court
required the school to share 40% of the student’s loss. Again, the court did not elaborate
why the article was applicable. Wei shijie Yu Shanghai Shi Liaoyang Zhongxue Jiaoyu
Jigou Zeren Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjue Shu魏仕杰与上海市辽阳中学教育机构责任纠
纷一审民事判决书 The Court Order in the Civil Case of Wei Shijie v. Shanghai Liaoyang
Education Bureau (上海市杨浦区人民法院) (Shanghai Yangpu District People’s Ct.,
April 20, 2015) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>;
(4) As guests, the plaintiff and defendant attended a party to celebrate the completion of a new
house. According to the local custom, guests participated in a game to hunt for steam-buns.
During the game, the defendant accidently fell and landed on the plaintiff’s right foot,
causing injuries. The court found that the defendant was not at fault, but it still ordered him
to pay RMB 1,300 ($200) for the plaintiff’s medical expenses. In addition, the court
ordered the defendant to share one half of the court filing fees, RMB 400 ($60). The court
only cited Article 24 of the TLL, but did not offer any explanation why the provision was
relevant to the case. Zhou Bifeng Yu Fang Taiyuan Shengming Quan, Jiankang Quan,
Shenti Quan Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjue Shu 周碧凤与方泰源生命、健康权、身体权
纠纷一审民事判决书The Court Order in a Civil Case of Zhou Bifeng v. Fang Taiyuan
Regarding Rights of Life, Health and Boby (浙江省建德市人民法院) (Zhejiang Province
Jiande People’s Ct., Dec. 5, 2014) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>;
(5) Wu voluntarily helped Lu to fix a waterpipe without expecting to receive payment. Wu
suspended his work because he did not feel well. Several hours later, Wu died of heart
failure. Wu’s relatives sued Lu for damages. Even though the court did not find fault with
Lu, it held that Article 24 was applicable and required Lu to share 10% of Wu’s medical
and funeral expenses. Unlike other cases, the court provided two lines in the judgment
reasoning that its holding was to promote the spirit of voluntariness and mutual assistance.
In fact, such a ruling is counterproductive, because people would refuse voluntary help for
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2010，the Research Institute of the TLL at the Supreme People’s Court, led by the then
Vice President Xi Xiaoming, published a book entitled, The Understanding and
Application of the TLL.37 Even though it is not legally binding, the book is regarded as a
reliable source for understanding Chinese tort law. In this book, Xi explained the following
key terms of Article 24:38
“Loss” and “Liability” According to Xi, Article 24 does not serve as a basis for assessing
whether the defendant is at fault. Thus, if a court requires the defendant to be responsible
for the victim’s loss, it does not necessarily mean he or she was actually at fault.39 Xi
cautioned the courts not to treat Article 24 as requiring strict liability.40
“May” and “share” Xi stated that sharing the victim’s loss should not be mandatory for
the defendant.41 However, he failed to clarify whether the defendant has a choice not to
share the loss. As the subsequent cases show, no court has followed Xi’s advice.
“According to circumstances” Xi stated that because Article 24 is not a fault based
provision, the sole basis for allocating the loss between the defendant and plaintiff is the
parties’ respective wealth.42 This provision “complies with the virtues, such as equity,
justice, honesty, friendship and sympathy, which are broadly recognized and accepted by
the public and conducive to building a harmonious society.”43 In short, the “circumstances”
in this Article means “[the parties’ respective] income, expenditure and responsibility to
the family and society.”44
Xi further stated that if the victim’s financial state has deteriorated seriously due to the
injuries, the court should require a well-to-do defendant to bear the entire loss.45 If the harm
fear of legal liability. Xiong Danying, Wu Maosheng Yu Lu Xiaofeng Yiwu Banggong Ren
Shouhai Zeren Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjue Shu熊单英、吴茂盛与鲁小凤义务帮工人受
害责任纠纷一审民事判决书 (The Court Order in the Civil Case of Xiong Danying, Wu
Maosheng v. Lu Xiaoyi in a dispute involving death in the course voluntary work (湖北省
武汉市武昌区人民法院) (Hubei Province Wuhan City Wuchang District People’s Ct.,
Dec. 1, 2015) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>.
37
XI XIAOMING (奚晓明), ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO QINQUAN ZE REN FA TIAOWEN LIJIE
YU SHIYONG (《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》条文理解与适用) [THE UNDERSTANDING AND
APPLICATION OF THE TLL], (2010).
38
See id. at 181–187.
39
See id. at 182.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 185.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 186.
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is insignificant, the court should hold the plaintiff responsible for his or her own loss.46 If
the plaintiff is wealthier than the defendant, the plaintiff should bear all the loss. If the
defendant has insurance, he or she should bear more of the loss.47
Even though Xi stated that Article 24 can only be used in limited cases,48 courts have
increasingly used the Article as a legal basis for deciding regular tort cases.49 In 2011, there
were only two cases based on Article 24, but in 2016, the number of cases based on Article
24 exceeded 700.50 In total, courts have applied the Article more than 2,000 times in all the
cases that the Supreme People’s Court has collected since 2011.51 After an extensive
review of recent litigation, this article has selected the following cases to demonstrate how
courts have applied the socialized liability principle. Some cases are more analytical than
others, but the results are the same: courts have regularly held that parties not at fault must
share losses with victims.
A. OU ZUMING V. HYDRAULIC POWER (HP)
HP52 is a hydraulic power station that maintains several river locks. In July 2011, HP
notified the local maritime department that it would release river locks for routine
46

Id.
Id.
48
Id. at 184.
49
The numbers are based on a search on July 21, 2017 on the Supreme People’s Court’s website,
www.wenshu.court.gov.cn with the searcher terms: 《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》第二十四
条. The search result is available at https://goo.gl/8GV62k (See the left side of the webpage).
50
Id.
51
Id. (See the upright corner of the web page.)
52
The summary of this case (Ou Zuming v. Hydraulic Power) is based on three reports:
(1) Ou Zuming Yu Chongqing Hangfa Jiafu Dianli Kaifa Youxian Gongsi Caichan Sunhai
Peichang Jiufen Shensu, Shenqing Zaishen Minshi Caijueshu (欧祖明与重庆航发嘉涪电力开发
有限公司财产损害赔偿纠纷申诉，申请再审民事裁决书) [The Court Order of the Property
Disputes between Ou Zuming and Chongqing Hangfa Jiafu Hydraulic Power Co.]
<shttp://wenshu.court.gov.cn/ (The link is no long active. A print copy of this report is on file with
the author)> (Chongqing High. People’s Ct. Aug. 22, 2016) (China).
(2) Ou Zuming Yu Chongqing Hangfa Jiafu Dianli Kaifa Youxian Gongsi Caichan Sunhai
Peichang Jiufen Er Shen Minshi Pan Jue Shu (欧祖明与重庆航发嘉涪电力开发有限公司财产
损害赔偿纠纷二审民事判决书) (The Court Order of the Property Disputes Between Ou Zuming
and Chongqing Hangfa Hydraulic Power Co.) < shttp://wenshu.court.gov.cn/ > (Chongqing No.1
Intermediate People’s Ct. Sept. 28, 2015) (China).
(3) Ou Zuming Yu Chongqing Longzhu Dianli Gufen Youxian Gongsi An’Ju Shuili Fadianchang,
Chongqing Longzhu Dianli Gufen Youxian Gongsi Caichan Sunhai Peichang Jiufen Zaishen
Shencha Minshi Caiding Shu (欧祖明与重庆龙珠电力股份有限公司安居水力发电厂, 重庆龙
珠电力股份有限公司财产损害赔偿纠纷再审审查民事裁定书) [The Court Order of the
47
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maintenance and asked the department to warn all passing vessels of the high level of water
in the river. By taking such measures, HP complied with state regulations regarding river
lock releases. The record showed that HP followed the regulation carefully by releasing
the locks gradually and sounding horns to ensure that passing vessels had ample time to
make the adjustment for the water rise. Mr. Ou Zuming, however, suffered severe property
damage to his flat-bottomed boat loaded with cargo during the lock release. Subsequently,
Ou Zuming sued HP, claiming that HP was negligent in releasing the water locks or, in the
alternative, should be held strictly liable for his loss.53
The court first denied Ou Zuming’s strict liability claim based on Article 132 of the
GPCL.54 The court reasoned that the river lock release was not one of the enumerated
activities considered abnormally dangerous according to the GPCL. Ou Zuming’s property
was located two kilometers away from the river locks and there was a large inlet, which
reduced the impact of the water rise. Consequently, Ou Zuming had an opportunity to react
to the release and protect his property. Therefore, HP was not strictly liable for Ou
Zuming’s loss. On the claim for negligence, the court reasoned that HP took all the
necessary measures to comply with the state regulation. Thus, HP was not negligent in
releasing the river locks. It seemed that the court was ready to rule in favor of HP, but, in
the end, it upheld the lower court’s decision requiring HP to pay RMB 200,000 ($30,000)
to cover Ou Zuming’s property loss based on Article 24 of the TLL.55
B. HU V. CHEN
On June 27, 2016, Chen Yunhai (Chen) hired Wu Daozhong (Wu) to refurbish the ceiling
of Chen’s apartment.56 The next day, Chen found Wu lying on the floor unconscious. Chen
immediately called an ambulance to take Wu to the hospital, where he was diagnosed as
possibly having suffered from a stroke. Chen paid RMB 1,800 ($266) for Wu’s medical
expenses. Wu subsequently checked into other hospitals for treatment before he died on
December 5, 2016. Wu’s widow sued Chen to recover damages for part of the medical
expenses, life support costs, funeral costs, and emotional distress in the amount of RMB
269,718.40 ($39,929). The trial court reasoned that the employment relationship between
Chen and Wu had no connection with Wu’s illness and his death and that Chen took
Property Disputes between Ou Zuming and Chongqing Longzhu Hydraulic Power Co.]
<shttp://wenshu.court.gov.cn> (Chongqing High. People’s Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (China).
53
Id. (2) Ou Zuming argued that releasing water from the river lock was an ultrahazardous activity
for which the defendant should be strictly liable. The court disagreed.
54
GPCL, at Art. 123.
55
See supra note 52 (1).
56
Hu Honglan Deng Shangsu Chen Haiyun Tigong Laowu Zhe Shouhai Jiufen Yi’an (胡宏兰等
上诉陈海云提供劳务者受害责任纠纷一案), [The Appellate Court Order of the Disputes
between
Hu
Honglan
and
Chen
Haiyun
Regarding
Personal
Injuries]
<shttp://wenshu.court.gov.cn> (Beijing No.1 Interm. People’s Ct. Sept. 26, 2016) (China).
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necessary measures to provide assistance for Wu’s rescue. Therefore, Chen was not at fault
and was not liable for Wu’s illness and death. Based on Article 24 of the TLL, however,
the court held that Chen must share a portion of Wu’s loss. It ordered Chen to pay RMB
15,000 ($2,220) in addition to the RMB 1,800 ($266) payment that Chen had already made
for Wu’s medical bills.57
Wu’s widow appealed the trial court decision, claiming that it erroneously applied Article
24 and that Chen should share a large portion of the loss. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s decision. In its reasoning, the appellate court provided some guidance on the
application of Article 24, which was rare for a Chinese court to do. The court emphasized
that the basic principle of tort law is liability based on fault in non-strict-liability cases.
Article 24 does not require parties not at fault to share liability, but only to share the loss
under certain circumstances. “Sharing loss” here does not mean that the two parties split
the loss equally. The court further interpreted the phrase “under the circumstances,” in the
sense that by invoking Article 24, courts should consider the following factors in deciding
about the amount of loss that the party not at fault should share:58
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The manner with which defendant acted [even if he or she was not at fault];
The circumstance under which the defendant acted;
The amount of loss to the plaintiff;
The benefit that defendant received from the plaintiff;
The disparity in wealth between the defendant and plaintiff.59

In this case, the appellate court found that the amount the trial court required Chen to share
was reasonable and denied the plaintiff’s claim for additional payment.
C. THE APPLICATION OF SOCIALIZED LIABILITY IN OU ZUMING AND HU
The Ou Zuming case and the Hu case were factually different and tried in different courts,
one in the most remote region and the other in Beijing. Nevertheless, the ultimate outcomes
in both cases were the same: the wealthier defendants were ordered to pay for damages to
the desperate plaintiffs. Based on the socialized liability principle, the courts in both cases
obligated the defendants to share some of their wealth with the plaintiffs, even though
neither defendant was at fault.
In Ou Zuming, the wealth gap and potential for social discontent was apparent to the court.
HP was a subsidiary of Chongqing Longzhu Power Group, a government-affiliated
company with a registered capital of close to RMB 300 million ($45 million). Compared
57
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with HP, Mr. Ou Zuming’s business was negligible. The $30,000 payment was only a tiny
fraction of HP’s wealth but vital for Mr. Ou Zuming to salvage his shattered business and
keep his workers employed. If the court had applied the principle of fault-based liability
and denied Mr. Ou Zuming’s claim, Mr. Ou Zuming and his fellow workers probably
would have protested the HP and the government. By applying the socialized liability
principle, however, the court avoided the potential for social unrest.
Similarly, in Hu, the court was fully aware of the wealth gap between the two parties, which
was reflected in the judgment. In 2016, the property values in Beijing increased by nearly
30% annually.60 An average two-bedroom apartment (80 square meters, or 860 square feet)
in Beijing was worth more than RMB 4,000,000 ($600,000).61 It was obvious to the court
that Chen’s wealth was far greater than that of Hu. As a migrant worker from Anhui
Province, Hu could only sell his hard labor in order to survive in Beijing. Without adequate
health insurance and pension benefits, Hu’s illness would quickly exhaust his life savings
and lead to bankruptcy. If uncompensated, Hu’s family members could have petition the
government for assistance. By invoking Article 24 in Hu, the court relieved pressure on the
government.
IV. ARTICLE 87 AND FALLING OBJECT CASES
While the rapid urbanization movement has improved living standards in China, it has also
created a unique legal problem: injury to a person by an object that falls from a multi-unit
residential building. Who is liable for the harm? Article 87 of the TLL, often referred to as
the “falling objects provision,” offers a clear answer: all occupants of the building, except
those who can exculpate themselves, are liable for the injury.
A. LUO V. LAO
On November 7, 2005,62 while Mr. Luo Jiezhi was eating dinner outside an apartment
building owned by Lao Xiquan (the Owner), a steel bar fell from above and hit Luo’s right
wrist, causing severe injuries.63 At the time of the incident, the Owner had a metal structure
to dry meat on the top of the building. Luo sued the Owner to recover medical and other
expenses.64 The court physician certified that Luo suffered an 8th degree disability, which
60

See China’s Property Boom Continues as Prices Rise at Record Rate, FORTUNE, (Oct. 20, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/10/21/china-property-prices-market/.
61
See BEIJING FANGJIA ZOUSHI (北京房价走势) [THE TREND OF PROPERTY VALUES IN BEIJING],
http://bj.cityhouse.cn/market/.
62
Qinquan Anjian Zhidao Anli Pingzhu (侵权案件指导案例评注) [Guiding Cases on Tort Law
with Commentaries], 284 (Xi Xiaoming (奚晓明) & Luo Dongchuan (罗东川) eds., 2009).
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Id.
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made him unable to work. The court relied on Article 126 of the GPCL, which states that
“if a building or any other installation or an object placed or hung on a structure collapses,
detaches, or drops and causes damage to others, its owner or manager shall bear civil
liability, unless he can prove he is not at fault.”65 The court held for Luo, the plaintiff,
because the Owner failed to produce proper evidence that he was not at fault.66
In practice, it is not enough for an owner to prove that he exercised reasonable care under
Article 126 of the GPCL. He has to prove that it was a third party, the plaintiff, or a natural
force that caused the plaintiff’s injury.67 Under the equitable liability principle in the TLL,
if neither the owner nor the plaintiff was at fault, the owner should still share the plaintiff’s
loss to the best of his ability.68 The payment is “not absolutely mandatory in nature.”69 The
share that the owner should pay depends on his financial situation. The better the financial
situation of the owner, the more he would have to pay for the cost of the plaintiff’s
injuries.70
B. WEN V. OWNER
On May 11, 2000, Mr. Hao was chatting with his neighbor outside a residential building,
in which twenty-two families lived.71 An ashtray suddenly fell from the building and
fractured Hao’s skull. Hao became mentally disabled and lost his ability to speak. Unable
to find out who threw the ashtray, Hao sued the twenty-two families in the building.
Except for two families that proved that they were not in the building, the remaining
twenty families failed to prove that they did not throw the ashtray. Therefore, the court
held that the twenty families were responsible for equal shares of Hao’s injuries.72
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Minfa Tongze (民法通则) [The General Principles of Civil Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 126 (Lawinfochina).
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Xi, supra note 62, at 284.
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Id.
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Id. at 285.
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Qinquan Zeren Fa Di 87 Tiao De Pingxi (高空抛物致人损害法律责任之我见—侵权责任法第
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C. ARTICLE 87 AND SOCIALIZED LIABILITY
Under Article 87, socialized liability is imposed because there is no well-developed social
safety net for injured victims to seek recovery. If a court followed traditional fault-based
principles, a victim injured by a falling object would likely be left without a remedy
because the costs to find the true tortfeasor and hold him liable would be prohibitively high.
Article 87, which enjoys support from both the public and the academia, has changed urban
living in various ways. Some homeowner management companies install security cameras
to catch wrongdoers, while others require occupants to contribute to a designated fund,
which covers the costs for injuries caused by falling objects. Article 87 also makes
neighbors to be vigilant about suspicious acts in the community. In addition, the Article
spreads the loss of accidents in multi-unit dwellings by increasing the costs of living in
them.
V. POSTHUMOUS DEFAMATION
One of the unique aspects of the Chinese tort law on emotional distress is that it allows
close relatives of the deceased to sue for emotional damages when a tortfeasor damages
the reputation or invades the privacy of the deceased. Even though there is no statutory
basis for this type of lawsuit, the Supreme People’s Court issued an interpretation that
recognizes the right of a posthumous reputation of a deceased person:
Close relatives of the dead can sue for emotional damages against a tortfeasor
who
(1) infringed upon the dead’s name, likeness, reputation, or honor by insulting,
libeling, disparaging, vilifying, or by other means contrary to public interests or
morality; or
(2) illegally disclosed or used the privacy of the dead or infringed upon the
privacy by other means contrary to public interests or morality.73

17, 2011), http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_37071.shtml.
73
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen Peichang Zeren Ruogan
Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于确定民事侵权精神赔偿责任若干问题的解释) [The
Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation On Certain Issues Regarding the Determination of Civil
Liability for Compensation for Emotional Damages] (promulgated by the Adjudication Comm. of
the Sup. People's Ct., Mar. 8, 2001, effective Mar. 10, 2001), art. 3,
http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab3189/info51740.htm (China).
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A. CHEN V. WU
In 1999, Wu Si published a book, Mao’s Peasant—Chen Yonggui, which was serialized in
the Beijing Youth Daily.74 Chen, who passed away in 1986, held the office of Vice Premier
of the State Council (the central cabinet of the Chinese government) from 1975 to 1980,
even though he was illiterate. Rising from a peasant in a remote village in the Shanxi
Province to a member of the Politburo of the Party, Chen owed his sudden fame primarily
to Mao’s disastrous policy choices during the peak of the Cultural Revolution.75 In the
book, Wu portrayed Chen’s early life, especially his role during the Japanese occupation
from 1937 to 1945. Relying on published articles, including an article by Chen’s elder son,
and other official archives, Wu claimed that Chen was a member of the “peace maintenance
group,” a puppet government established by the Japanese to manage affairs in the occupied
areas.76 In that position, Chen was responsible for collecting grains and vital information
for the Japanese army. After World War II, Chen was arrested and humiliated for his role
in aiding the Japanese occupiers. In his application for Party membership after the war,
Chen acknowledged his past involvement in the “peace maintenance group” and sought
the Party’s forgiveness. All these files regarding Chen’s history were well kept in the
Party’s archives. Wu cited the files together with other historical records, memoirs, and
interviews in his book to support his claim.77
In 2002, Chen Yonggui’s wife, and other close relatives sued Wu for defaming the late
Vice Premier through Wu’s disclosure of Chen’s treasonous past, and for degrading Chen’s
status as a prominent state official and as a member of the respected party elite. The
relatives requested the court to order Wu and the publisher to issue a public apology to
Chen’s family. In addition, the relatives claimed that they suffered emotional distress
because of Wu’s book and sought RMB 100,000 ($14,000) for emotional damages.78
In defense, Wu and the publisher provided a detailed list of publications, archives, personal
memoirs, and interviews, claiming that the author did not fabricate the facts with intent to
defame Chen. In fact, there was an article written by Chen’s elder son, which detailed
Chen’s role in the “peace maintenance group.”79 Wu claimed that he accurately depicted
Chen’s early life based on his extensive research and interviews. While the court did not
74
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dispute that the author had no intent to smear Chen, it held that Wu cited unauthoritative
sources because neither the Party nor the government validated personal memoirs.
Furthermore, the author had failed to verify the authoritativeness and authenticity of the
sources that he cited in the book. The court’s reasoning instantly drew criticism from the
academia. Professor He Bing commented:
The judge here probably wanted to say that authors must rely on
authoritative materials in analyzing historical events. The problem is,
however, what are authoritative materials? Who will decide what kinds of
materials are authoritative? Should the judge have the power to decide what
materials that an author must use in his academic research? This judgement
is questionable because it suppresses academic freedom. Should authors be
legally liable for their mistakes in the research? If the answer is yes, it will
have a chilling effect on academic research.80
Despite strong criticism, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision that Wu and
the publisher must issue an official public apology in the Beijing Youth Daily and pay RMB
20,000 ($2,960) for emotional damages.
Unlike previous cases, the court in Chen v. Wu did not apply the socialized liability
principle to bridge the wealth gap between the two parties. As a prolific writer, Wu did not
face financial hardship in paying the damages. Instead, the court applied the socialized
liability principle to prohibit Wu from questioning the official narrative of the Party’s
history. Through this case, the court essentially warned liberal intellectuals that any attempt
to shed a different light on the Party’s legacy, even with credible evidence, would lead to
a prosecution for defamation, a serious offense punishable by fines, forced apology, or
even imprisonment.81 The logic is simple: the Party’s historical accounts, however
embellished, serve as the foundation for its legitimacy to govern the country. Questioning
the Party’s past leads the public to lose faith in the Party and thus threatens social stability.
In Chen v. Wu, the versatile aspect of the socialized liability principle became the basis for
the court to manipulate the defamation law to safeguard the Party’s unblemished image.
VI. THE COMPLICATIONS OF SOCIALIZED LIABILITY
The principle of socialized liability plays a unique role in the Chinese legal system. If a
court adjudicates tort cases exclusively on a fault basis, some victims will be remediless
80
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because not all defendants are at fault. By leaving a victim empty-handed, however, a court
runs the risks of creating serious social problems. A victim, who has lost his or her earning
capacity due to injuries, often ends up being both financially insolvent and emotionally
distraught. In the absence of a well-maintained social safety net, uncompensated victims
sometimes end up petitioning the government for the rest of their lives because they have
no other options. Victims urge the government to award them with a sense of justice and
welfare.
For a Chinese court, compensating victims is more important than determining whether the
defendants are at fault. As one Chinese scholar observed, the principle of equitable liability
is a “Robin Hood” style social redistribution, by which the court compels the rich defendant
to pay the poor victim regardless of fault.82 The principle, which is deeply rooted in
socialism, has gone far beyond the realm of traditional tort law.83 In this sense, the Chinese
government uses the tort law to achieve multiple goals, including providing social benefits
to victims and equalizing the wealth between the rich and poor. However, the socialized
liability principle is not a panacea for legal disputes in China, especially when the
defendant is the government.
A. THE CASE OF JI ZHONGXING
Ji, like millions of migrants, left his village and went searching for a new life in the coastal
cities.84 Upon his friend’s advice, Ji bought a motorbike and began to offer rides for money,
competing for customers with licensed taxi drivers. During a crackdown on illegal taxis in
2005, a group of police officers caught Ji, and he was severely beaten. When Ji woke up in
the hospital, he realized that he was permanently paralyzed. Ji brought an administrative
lawsuit against the officers and local government seeking compensation of RMB
334,782.49 ($48,658.12).85 He also sued the officers in a tort suit, claiming RMB
338,266.99 ($49,134.34) in damages.86 The local court, which is an integral part of the
government, dismissed both of Ji’s lawsuits for lack of evidence.87 Without compensation,
Ji quickly exhausted his savings by paying his medical bills. His brother brought him back
to the village, where his father and other relatives took care of him.
82
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Losing faith in the justice system, Ji petitioned the local government, which denied any
wrongdoing.88 Ji went on to petition the central government in Beijing, which sent the case
back to the local government. Under internal pressure, the police department finally offered
Ji RMB 100,000 ($14,503), but it stated clearly that the payment was for humanitarian
assistance only and was not intended as an admission of guilt.89 The police department
asked Ji to sign a document, which Ji did not fully understand. In fact, the document he
signed waived any further claim against the department. After spending nearly all of the
payment to settle overdue medical bills, Ji remained destitute.90 The police department
rejected Ji’s subsequent petitions by claiming that his acceptance of the payment legally
barred him from pursuing any further claims. Ji was furious that the police department had
tricked him into accepting the settlement offer without a chance to seek independent
counsel. From then on, Ji was determined to protest the injustice at the Beijing International
Airport.91
On July 21, 2013, Ji detonated a homemade bomb while he was sitting in his wheelchair
in the front lobby of the Beijing International Airport.92 Except for Ji, no one was hurt
because he loudly warned travelers about the bomb and he did not throw it into the crowd.93
The explosion caused severe injuries to Ji’s left hand, which was subsequently amputated.94
During the trial, Ji’s lawyer argued that he did not intend to hurt anyone and used the airport
lobby to protest the wrongs that the local government had done to him.
Despite finding no intent, the court convicted Ji of the crimes of endangering public safety
and engaging in an act of terrorism and sentenced him to prison for six years.95 To the
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government’s surprise, Ji won public sympathy.96 If the local court had applied the
socialized liability principle in the first place and required the police to compensate Ji, he
would not have taken the extreme measures of protesting the injustice.97
In cases such as Ji’s, the court often finds itself in a quandary: ruling in favor of the victim
will jeopardize the judge’s opportunity for reappointment or promotion, but ruling for the
government will leave the uncompensated victim with no choice but to resort to informal
and sometimes extreme measures, resulting in public disturbance. Ji’s case demonstrates
that the application of the socialized liability principle can be complicated when the
government is a defendant.98
VII.

MASS TORTS, SOCIALIZED LIABILITY, AND DISUTILITY OF THE TORT LAW

The primary purpose of the socialized liability principle is to maintain social stability. The
application of the principle can take various forms. In dealing with negligence disputes
among a small number of parties, courts use the principle to bypass fault-based analyses
96
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and directly order a rich defendant to pay for a poor plaintiff’s injuries. In doing so, courts
prevent disgruntled plaintiffs from threatening social stability.
In mass tort cases, the government circumvents the entire legal proceeding by invoking the
socialized liability principle. This dramatic application of the principle enables the
government to prevent a large group of tort victims from filing a class action, which is
deemed to be a serious threat to the foundation of the authoritarian regime. Top leaders of
a local government may face demotion or even criminal investigation if a class action or
public protest erupts under their watch. Thus, socialized liability has transformed mass tort
from a legal issue into a sensitive political issue that courts are ill-equipped to resolve.
To suppress any form of class actions and public protests in mass tort cases, the government
usually takes the following measures: first, the government instructs courts to dismiss mass
tort claims. When courts cease to apply the law, the TLL becomes a set of empty promises.
Chinese courts are an integral part of the government, which controls the courts’ funding
and appointments.99 Instead of being an independent branch, courts submit to the top
leaders of the government. For example, the government of Guangxi Province issued a
notice directing courts not to take 13 kinds of cases, all of which involved sensitive issues,
including mass torts.100 Even though Chinese scholars criticized the notice for encroaching
upon judicial independence,101 the government has continued to instruct courts, through
internal directives, not to take cases that it deems sensitive.102 Furthermore, the government
prohibits lawyers from representing mass tort plaintiffs. Lawyers who violate the
government instruction will face disciplinary sanctions, disbarment, detention, or even
imprisonment.103

99

Chenglin Liu, Escaping Liability Via Forum Non Conveniens: ConocoPhillips's Oil Spill in
China, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 167 (2014).
100
Luo Changping (罗昌平), Guangxi Fayuan Bushouli 1 3 Lei Anjian Shexian Guibi Fengxian
Zhuanjia Weiji (广西法院不受理13类案件 涉嫌规避风险转嫁危机) [Guangxi Court Denied 13
Types of Cases Fueling the Suspicion of Diverting Crisis], PEOPLE’S NET (Aug. 12, 2004),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/35560/2705126.html.
101
Qian Wei (钱炜), Guangxi Fayuan Bushouli 1 3 Lei Anjian Shenggaoyuan Cheng You Guoqing
Jueding(广西法院不受理13类案件 省高院称由国情决定) [Guangxi High Court Defended That
Denying 13 Types of Cases Was Due To China’s Special Situation], CHINA.COM (Aug. 24, 2004),
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/difang/643257.htm.
102
Chen Tao (陈涛)，Yifa Kangzheng Zhong de “Fayuan Bu Shouli” Xianxiang Yianjiu (依法抗
争中的 “法院不受理”现象研究) [On the Phenomenon of "the Court Dismisses the Case" in
Rightful Resistance], 1 J.E. CHINA U. SCI. & TECH. （华东理工大学学报）1, 2–5, (2015).
103
Chris Buckley, People’s Daily Details Allegations Against Lawyers Detained in China, N. Y.
Times (July 13, 2015), https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/peoples-daily-detailsallegations-against-detained-lawyers/.

38

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 59 Online Journal

Second, the government forces the mass tort victims to accept low compensation and sign
a promise not to pursue further litigation. In doing so, the government avoids judicial
proceedings and minimizes the social impact of mass tort litigation, protects industry, and
preserves social stability. Thus, the socialized liability principle applies in mass tort cases
through an extra-judicial process firmly controlled by the government. The socialized
liability principle in mass torts cases also denotes that it is both a socialist virtue and
absolute obligation for mass torts victims to willingly accept government-set
compensation, refrain from coordinating with other victims to protest inadequate
settlement, and make personal sacrifices for the common good—a stable society.
A key reason that the government restricts courts from taking mass tort cases is its concern
that open litigation could expose corrupt practices and other crimes committed by
government officials.104 In mass tort cases, the tortious parties are usually SOEs or
enterprises with strong government backing. Any negative information about the defendant
could taint the government’s image and cause the public to lose faith in the government.105
Another reason could be that the government has little confidence in judicial resolution of
mass tort cases.106 An unfavorable judgment, for instance, would cause victims to petition
the central government in Beijing.107 Because the local leaders are not elected, but are
appointed by the government at the higher level, they are accountable only to the higher
government.108 Maintaining social stability is the most important job for local leaders.
Victims’ petitions or protests would show that the local leaders have failed to do their
jobs.109 Therefore, the government would rather handle mass tort cases by itself than having
the courts resolving the issues.
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Even without government instructions, judges are reluctant to take sensitive cases.110 They
have the same concern that dissatisfied victims would take to the streets demanding
adequate compensation, costing them their political career. Furthermore, the government
evaluates judges annually based on a set of criteria, including whether parties accept their
judgments and whether a higher court frequently overturns their judgments.111 Unlike
adjudicating simple civil cases, judges in mass tort cases run a higher risk of provoking
protests, which diminishes judges’ opportunity for reappointment and promotion.112
Courts also avoid sensitive cases to increase the rate of resolution (the ratio of resolved
cases to admitted cases) and thereby creating the impression that the courts are efficient. A
higher rate of resolution can also serve as a basis for judges to receive a sizable year-end
bonus.113 It would take courts more time and resources to handle mass tort cases than
regular cases, and there is no certainty that courts could resolve them to the government’s
satisfaction.114 Thus, it is in the best interest of a court to deny mass tort cases. In addition,
court fees are based on a percentage of the amount in dispute. Even though the law requires
courts to submit all court fees to the state treasury, courts still have various ways to reserve
a portion of filing fees for their own use.115 Therefore, courts have no financial incentive
to take mass tort cases.116
In refusing mass tort cases, courts can exploit multiple loopholes in the civil procedure law.
Upon receiving a complaint, courts can remain silent without giving an official rejection
order,117 and essentially refuse to hear the case. In addition, courts sometimes even refuse
to issue receipts for evidence presented to the court,118 despite the requirement that they do
so.119 This may be due to the fear that the plaintiffs will use the receipts as evidence to hold
110
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the court accountable. Perhaps due to these vagaries, studies have shown that less than one
percent of all environmental cases in China are resolved through the court systems.120
Such practice would not be necessarily illegal as the procedure law provides the courts
with broad discretion to deny claims. According to Articles 119 and 123 of the Civil
Procedure Law of China, courts should accept a case when the plaintiff alleges “specific
claims, facts, and reasons.”121 Many courts have interpreted this as requiring plaintiffs to
produce substantial evidence of a claim before the court decides whether to accept the case
for review.122 Thus, plaintiffs must produce persuasive evidence of their claim to convince
the court to hear the case.123 Some courts have even required that plaintiffs demonstrate a
causal link in the evidence before they will accept a case.124 The following event
demonstrates how the local government relied on the socialized liability principle to
sidestep the court system and forced the victims to accept inadequate compensations.
A. STUDENTS KILLED IN THE SICHUAN EARTH QUAKE
On May 12, 2008, a 7.9 magnitude earthquake in Sichuan Province caused 68,712 deaths,
with an estimated 18,000 missing, most of whom were presumed dead.125 In some areas,
only school buildings suffered total damage while other buildings survived, which led the
public to suspect shoddy construction and corruption.126 Since the earthquake occurred in
the afternoon during regular school session, students did not have a chance to escape the
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buildings. In a high school in Juyuan, for example, more than 270 students died.127 The
Beichuan Middle School building, moreover, was reduced to rubble in just 5 seconds.128
According to a report released by the Sichuan Education Bureau, the earthquake destroyed
7,000 school classrooms, killing between 5,000129 to 10,000 schoolchildren.130 It remains
unknown how many schoolchildren were severely injured or disabled. As a result of the
one-child policy at the time,131 most of the school children who died or were injured were
the only child in their family, which exacerbated the pain and suffering of their parents.132
The shoddy construction was plainly evident as untrained eyes could find irregularities.
Parents and rescuers reported that the steel rods found in the broken concrete slabs were
no thicker than a ballpoint pen.133 The twisted steel rods from the debris were so weak that
an artist straightened them with his bare hands.134 Experts from the United States and China
agreed that the buildings could have withstood the earthquake if proper steel and concrete
materials had been used during their construction.135 The China Daily, a government
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newspaper, stated, “We cannot afford not to raise uneasy questions about the structural
quality of school buildings.”136
Tort litigation would have shed light on whether the earthquake, the construction defects,
or a combination of the two, caused the collapse of the school buildings. The construction
firms would have had opportunities to defend themselves if they could show they exercised
reasonable care in selecting construction materials and complying with the building code.
If the construction defects indeed were the cause of the destruction of the school buildings,
the parents would justifiably hold the negligent builders liable and put the public on notice
of the builder’s tortious conduct to prevent future harm. If litigation uncovered illegal acts,
such as corruption, concerned parties including the builders would have been subject to
criminal prosecution. Tort lawsuits would have provided an opportunity for both parties to
seek justice.
It seems that tort litigation is complementary to the government’s efforts to resolve disputes
and maintain social stability. The parents, however, did not even have a chance to protest
near the court house. An armed anti-riot police squad forcefully dispersed a protest
organized by about 100 parents, who held their deceased children’s pictures in front of the
court building.137 In a separate incident in 2009, the police detained an eight-year-old boy
along with his father overnight in prison in order to locate the boy’s uncle who had plan to
petition the government for the death of his children in the earthquake.138
Despite pledging to investigate the collapsed buildings, the local government ended the
investigation hastily by concluding that the earthquake was the sole cause of the collapse
of the school buildings.139 The government may have feared that a thorough investigation
would have unearthed corruption or other illegal acts, causing even more public resentment
and ultimately threatening social stability. To prevent any further investigation, the
government cordoned off140 and “bulldozed the remains of many schools” only a month
after the earthquake.141 Subsequently, the central government issued a report attributing
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the deaths and injuries of school children to shoddy construction, but it did not serve as a
legal basis for parents to sue because the restrictions on civil litigation were still in place.
By circumventing the court proceedings, the government forced the parents to accept a
comprehensive package, which paid $8,800 for the death of a child and $5,600 per parent
for a pension.142 The pension payment was intended to replace the benefits that the parents
would have received after retirement if their children lived to adulthood.143 The parents
were initially not willing to accept the payment because it was too low. Once the parents
accepted the compensation, they had to sign a contract promising not to protest against the
government about the schools that collapsed. Instead of admitting responsibility for
mismanagement, the contract portrayed the payment as a social benefit that the government
granted to the parents. To receive the “benefit,” the parent had to agree, “From now on,
under the leadership of the party and the government, we will obey the law and maintain
social order……We vow resolutely not to take part in any activity that disturbs postearthquake reconstruction.”144
VIII. CONCLUSION
Through the lens of the socialized liability principle, the analysis of leading case sheds
light on the various unique features of the TLL. Socialized liability allows Chinese courts
to hold a party who is not at fault liable for victim’s injuries. Conversely, it also permits
courts to deny claims against a party who is at fault in mass tort cases in the name of
maintaining social stability. Despite its elusiveness, socialized liability serves a vital
purpose as it ensures that the injured victim will receive compensation in non-class action
litigation regardless of whether the defendants are at fault in traditional negligence terms.
Otherwise, the government fears that uncompensated victims may resort to undesirable
dispute-resolution channels, such as openly petitioning the government, protesting in front
of government buildings, posting embarrassing exposés online, or venting anger through
acts that threaten public safety, all of which could undermine social stability.145
142

Id.
According to Chinese culture and law, children are responsible for taking care of their aging
parents.
144
Wong, supra note 134.
145
The Party and the government attaches great importance to maintaining social stability, which
overrides any other interests including the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. On Feb. 7,
2017, the Supreme People’s Court of PRC issued the Notice on the Implementation of the
Protection of Judicial Personals, Guanyu Yinfa 《 Renmin Fayuan Luoshi 〈 Baohu Sifa Renyuan
Yifa Lüxing Fading Zhize Guiding 〉 De Shishi Banfa 》 De Tongzhi (关于印发《人民法院落
实〈保护司法人员依法履行法定职责规定〉的实施办法》的通知) (Article 11 of the Notice
prohibits protests in the adjacent area of the court buildings in the forms of siting out, blocking
access, distributing leaflets, shouting slogans, and displaying banners. Punishments for violation of
the
notice
range
from
administrative
actions
to
criminal
penalty.)
143

44

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 59 Online Journal

In cases of mass torts, however, the government fears that victims suffering similar injuries
could form an influential group and collectively fight in court against tortious SOEs as well
as private companies possibly backed by the government for corrective reasons. Inquiries
into fault could expose problems of mismanagement and corruption, attracting unnecessary
attention and arousing public resentment. The advent of social media, albeit tightly
censored in China, makes it difficult for the government to block information. The strategy
for the government, therefore, is preemptively to prevent victims from congregating online
or on the streets by compelling them to accept government-determined compensation,
although grossly inadequate in monetary terms, and to promise not to pursue further
litigation. The government then directs courts not to take their claims, bars lawyers from
litigating mass tort cases, and invokes criminal laws to punish disgruntled agitators. The
government takes all these measures in the name of maintaining social stability, the
cornerstone of the dubious legal concept of socialized liability.
Scholars often refer to Article 24 as an example of equitable liability, which is clearly a
misnomer as it is certainly inequitable to hold a party not at fault liable in cases where there
is no justification for imposing strict liability. Yet, scholars are correct that there is a
“benefit” created by compelling a non-fault party to pay or by shielding a party who is at
fault from litigation. But they have missed the crucial question of where the “benefit” goes.
The analysis based on socialized liability principle reveals that the “benefit” goes to the
state, which fails to provide a social safety net. In this sense, courts have become a tool for
the government to redistribute wealth, compensate the victims, and maintain social
stability. The concerns about social stability and state interests take precedence over any
analysis of fault in non-strict liability cases. Even though socialized liability defies the
traditional notion of justice, it remains a pragmatic tool in the TLL precisely because of its
flexible, adaptive, and ambiguous nature.

http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2017/02/id/149109.shtml.

